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ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the introduction and implementation of the pilot project Twitcident in an emergency 
response room setting. Twitcident is a web-based system for filtering, searching and analyzing data on 
real-world incidents or crises. Social media data is seen as important for emergency response opera-
tions: it can be used as an ‘early warning monitoring system’ to detect social unrest, and for improving 
common operational pictures (COPs). This chapter shows that the expectations on the functioning of 
the tool were not fully met: first it was hard for the response room professionals to make sense of the 
data and second, the management did not develop a proper project planning. The recommendations are 
twofold. On the one hand, the professionals who work with Twitcident must invest in developing new 
information management routines. On the other hand, the response room management needs to create 
a much more inclusive project learning strategy.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last five years, the use of social media and social networks such as Twitter, Facebook, Yammer 
and Instagram by citizens at times of crisis has gained the attention of professionals operating in crisis 
response organizations, such as the police, fire service and medical teams (Palen, 2008; Merchant, Elmer, 
& Lurie, 2011). In the crisis management literature it has been recognized for decades that citizens are 
From Reactive to Proactive 
Use of Social Media in 
Emergency Response:
A Critical Discussion of the 
Twitcident Project
Kees Boersma
VU University, The Netherlands
Dominique Diks
Hiemstra en De Vries, The Netherlands
Julie Ferguson
VU University, The Netherlands
Jeroen Wolbers
VU University, The Netherlands
237
From Reactive to Proactive Use of Social Media in Emergency Response
 
self-reliant when there is social disruption and in crisis situations, whether those are incidents, emergen-
cies or large-scale disasters (Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004). Nowadays, social media platforms provide 
a new opportunity for people to keep each other informed, adding a bottom-up information network 
that provides a platform for online communication (Machjzrack & More, 2010). In addition, they can 
potentially provide welcome additional resources for professionals in crisis response organizations. The 
promise is that, by using social media data, the first responders can enlarge their common operational 
picture (COP) (Yin, Lampert, Cameron, Robinson, & Power, 2012).
Yet, although the response organizations have started to recognize the importance of social media 
data during times of crisis, how this data actually can be made sense of, interpreted, validated and used 
is still an issue that requires further research. Therefore, professional crisis response organizations have 
also carried out (pilot) information management projects to understand how social media platforms 
actually work and how they can include social media data in their operations, both day-to-day and dur-
ing crises. Over the years, many pilot projects have been implemented to test social media platforms as 
early warning systems, and to provide professionals with data that predicts upcoming social disruptions 
(Goolsby, 2010). In particular, the police have undertaken projects to determine how they could use 
social media data in their surveillance activities (Crump, 2011). Whereas for a long time social media 
data was regarded merely as ‘noise’ or, at best, not validated data1, these projects indicate that crisis 
response managers and professionals are starting to take social media and Web 2.0 platforms seriously. 
Their problem, however, is how to incorporate these new information flows properly into existing in-
formation architectures in order to build a coherent crisis information system and, eventually, make the 
emergency response more reliable.
In this chapter we will present a project management case from the physical safety in the Netherlands, 
where 25 safety regions were established in 2007 to cover the crisis response across the whole country 
(Boersma, Groenewegen, & Wagenaar, 2010; Boersma, Wagenaar, & Wolbers, 2012). The safety regions 
have various functions. First, they facilitate integration between the two main first response disciplines: 
the fire service and the ambulance service medical teams. They work closely together with the police, 
who are organized at the national level in the Netherlands. Second, each safety region has had to es-
tablish a bureau responsible for developing emergency response plans and strategies and for how their 
professionals communicate with those in other emergency services, with policymakers and with citizens. 
Third, the safety region bureau is responsible for undertaking a specific risk analysis and assessment for 
the region. Finally, the safety region must ensure that there is a dispatch center, or emergency response 
room function, available. In the response room all three of the first response disciplines or services (po-
lice, fire and ambulance) are represented. The response room can be shared with other safety regions, 
on condition that the on condition that they are still able to respond adequately to incoming calls from 
citizens from across their own region.
Since 2012, those responsible for managing the safety regions have started to improve their crisis 
information management by implementing social media projects. For the various professionals work-
ing in the safety regions, however, it is still difficult to include social media data in their information 
management at times of emergency. The case we will present in this chapter is a pilot project from one 
of the 25 Dutch safety regions. In this region a project called Twitcident has been put in place to see how 
social media data – and in particular data from Twitter – could be used in the response room setting. It 
is a web-based system for filtering, searching and analyzing data on real-world incidents or crises. The 
project started in April 2014 and has been used by the region. We studied the implementation of the 
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project and interviewed the professionals who were directly and indirectly involved in the introduction 
and in the actual use of Twitcident. We studied the aims and goals of the project, the expectations of the 
professionals involved, how Twitcident was used, and the first results. Our research question is:
How did Twitcident affect the developing of a common operational picture between different professional 
disciplines in an emergency control room setting?
The sub-questions are:
Why did the management of the safety region initiate the Twitcident pilot project?
How was Twitcident implemented?
How did Twitcident affect the work of the emergency response room professionals?
We collected our data through observations and interviews during the first half of 2014. Our main 
concern was to understand both the expectations of the management and the experience of actually using 
Twitcident, a framework and web-based system for filtering, searching and analyzing data on real-world 
incidents or crises (Abel, Hauff, Houben, Stronkman, & Tao, 2012). In both of these areas, sensemaking 
in crisis situations (Weick, 1988) was a central issue for us: we were curious to know how those involved 
made sense of the complex coordination and information-sharing practices in emergency and crisis situa-
tions. Sensemaking is seen by Weick as a cognitive activity and ability of framing experienced situations 
as meaningful. Collective sensemaking is the collaborative process in which different individuals start 
to create shared awareness and understanding of the situation.
We conducted a total of 17 interviews with managers, information system engineers (who were 
responsible for the actual implementation of the project), professionals from the region’s emergency 
response room, and police officers. Our most important sources of information were the centralists and 
generalists working in the response room. The centralists who do the intake (i.e., receive the incoming 
emergency calls), validate and, where possible, enrich the data and pass it on to the first responders in the 
field. The generalists who work with additional information sources such as social media platforms and 
applications that can enrich social media data – the Twitcident project being one example – to provide 
the centralists with additional information.
Over a period of two months, we observed how the interaction between the generalists and centralists 
took place, and how Twitcident added to the quality of the information exchange, if at all. We selected 
this style of ethnographic research and in-situ research in order to gain a fuller picture of the context 
of the response room and the background to the routines of the generalists and centralists (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg, 2009). The generalists wrote daily diaries or logbooks, which were very useful in helping 
us to understand their actions and see what kind of data analysis they undertook with Twitcident. We 
were also able to get access to formal documents about the pilot project and to the work manuals and 
standard operational procedures used by the generalists and centralists.
The objectives of this chapter are first of all to understand how pilot projects function as a ‘protected 
space’ for introducing and testing new, contested information technologies. Second, we would like to 
present an actual case in the context of a demanding environment, i.e., the emergency response room, 
where the time pressures constrain a smooth introduction of new technologies.
239
From Reactive to Proactive Use of Social Media in Emergency Response
 
BACKGROUND
In the literature on emergency management, adopting a COP is proposed as the solution to poor commu-
nication and information-sharing practices in and between response organizations (Wolbers & Boersma, 
2013). The idea is that a COP is an integrated part of an information system and used to overcome prob-
lems such as information overload, or insufficient evaluation and validation of the information. A COP 
is defined as the display of relevant information shared by more than one command or unit. Potentially, 
COPs contribute to a better situational awareness, which is the perception of environmental elements 
during incidents, emergencies and crises with respect to time, space and meaning, critical to the decision-
making processes of professional first responders (Sarter & Woods, 1991; Bosse, Majdanik, Boersma, 
& Ingibergsdóttir, 2013). Adequate information management is seen as a precondition for creating a 
high-quality COP. Technical solutions are seen as the answer to failing information management. Over 
the years emergency response rooms information systems have been ‘enriched’ by a myriad of tools to 
enable and improve information management and thus the creation of COPs. The newest generation of 
tools that have been added to emergency response rooms are meant to make social media data suitable 
for use in emergency response information management.
Social media sites, and Twitter in particular, are seen as an important (additional) source of informa-
tion in emergency and crisis situations (Mendoza, Poblete, & Castillo, 2010; Schultz, Utz, & Göritz, 
2011; Hughes & Palen, 2009; Cassa, Chunara, Mandl, & Brownstein, 2013). With applications such as 
Twitcident the centralists in the emergency response rooms can actually follow what citizens post on 
social media and how citizens’ information networks come into being. Twitcident can be seen as part of 
a larger trend in crisis management and practice to enlarge the number of sources for creation of relevant 
information. In particular, during actual crises and emergencies, information needs to be up-to-date and 
dynamic (Treurniet, Messemaker, Wolbers and Boersma, 2015). Since the crisis or emergency is con-
stantly changing, the centralists demand sources that can deal with the speed of change. Social media 
sources have the potential to provide a greater quantity of information and more up-to-date information 
than other, more static, sources such as databases and information from incoming emergency calls.
The use of social media data in crisis and emergency situations is promising, but not without problems. 
There are serious concerns relating to the quality of the data from social media platforms, the validation 
of social media data (Yates & Paquette, 2011), the filtering of relevant information from messy social 
media data sources (Abel et al., 2012; Oh, Agrawal, & Rao, 2013), and the process of combining social 
media data with relevant data from other sources (Vieweg, Hughes, Starbird, & Palen, 2010). There are 
also more fundamental problems such as legal issues and questions to do with privacy and surveillance 
(Van de Walle, Turoff, & Hiltz, 2009; Fuchs, Boersma, Albrechtslund, & Sandoval, 2011).
Besides the more practical problems relating to the use of social media in emergency and crisis situ-
ations, we see that the expectations can be sky-high. The idea that social media data is useful for crisis 
situations can be seen as information technology hype (Meijer, Boersma, & Wagenaar, 2009). A hype 
can be agenda-setting, but in instances where promises cannot be met, users start to be very disappointed. 
Through a lack of planning or thoughtless introduction and implementation people will no longer buy 
in to the hype at all in particular when the claims are exaggerated (Ruef & Markard, 2010). In addition, 
projects always run the risk of becoming dysfunctional in different project phases, particularly in situ-
ations in which there is no common understanding of the project (Van Marrewijk, 2007; Veenswijk, 
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Van Marrewijk, & Boersma, 2010). Crucial for the success or failure of a project such as Twitcident is 
a careful and thoughtful plan for its introduction, monitoring and evaluation (Edmondson, Bohmer, & 
Pisano, 2001).
In order to be successful, Twitcident must be seen as a social, organizational project and not solely 
as a technical project (Barley, 1986; Orlikowski, & Barley, 2001). However, it has already been known 
for decades that IT innovation projects are often based on a relatively naïve picture of organizational 
change. Events, features, and behaviors that are important to the project’s success or failure tend to be 
overlooked (Markus & Robey, 1988; Ciborra & Lanzara, 1994; Boersma & Kingma, 2005; Mirvis, Sales, 
& Hackett 2006). In this chapter, therefore, we will reflect upon Twitcident not only as a useful additional 
source of information in crisis management, but we will also consider the particular characteristics of 
the project, and the way it has been introduced and implemented in the organization.
THE INTRODUCTION AND USE OF TWITCIDENT IN THE 
EMERGENCY CONTROL ROOM SETTING
In 2012 the Dutch safety regions took an important step in optimizing their information management 
and information processes. This involved the establishment of real-time intelligence centers (RTICs) 
(Inspectorate of Safety and Justice, 2013). The information technologies used in the RTICs were primar-
ily meant to support police work, but since the centers were housed next to the response rooms, they 
also started to collect and share information with the fire and ambulance service. The idea behind the 
RTICs is mainly to create an ‘early warning monitoring system’. Centralists are supposed to consult the 
RTIC information to evaluate and monitor the atmosphere and the behavior of citizens in town centers.
Monitoring citizens’ behavior became an issue for the safety regions’ bureau after the so-called 
project X incident, during which social media platforms were used to mobilize people to come together 
for partying. In 2012 a project X party in the Netherlands got out of hand, because the police could not 
prevent serious rioting during the party (Van Dijck & Poell, 2013). Second, the information from the 
RTIC is supposed to enable centralists, and eventually officers in the field, to create an improved COP 
of the emergency situation and of the actions and interactions taking place on the ground.
The management of the safety region considered the RTIC the perfect place in which to implement 
the Twitcident pilot project. Before the introduction of the RTICs to the emergency response rooms, 
centralist only looked incidentally into social media data, and they had no analytical tools like Twitcident 
at their disposal.
Setting the Scene: Centralists and Generalists
In order to understand the relative value of Twitcident (and, in a broader sense, social media data), we 
will describe the organization of the emergency response rooms and their role in the safety region.
The emergency response room and RTIC featured in our study are housed in two rooms next to each 
other, separated by a glass wall. The rooms are connected by a door that is always open, so that the 
professionals working there can easily walk from one room to the other, to ask for feedback, exchange 
information in person, or request validation of decisions or actions. For the generalists it is important to 
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be able to see what is going on in the emergency response room so that they can respond instantly to the 
‘body language’ of their colleagues asking for additional information. The workstations of the centralists 
and the generalists are very similar.
The centralists in the response room are the dispatchers; they operate the response information 
systems, take the incoming calls, evaluate the relevance and quality of the information received, and 
are responsible for disseminating the information to the appropriate first responders on the streets. The 
centralists have sophisticated communication and information systems at their disposal (Wagenaar, 
Boersma, Groenewegen, & Niemandsverdriet, 2009). About ten years ago, a new integrated information 
system was introduced for the response rooms, which used the software GMS, the Dutch abbreviation 
for an Integrated Emergency Room System. This system integrates various services and systems such 
as the 1-1-2 phone number (the Dutch equivalent of the 9-1-1 emergency number in North America), 
communication, radio and telephone systems used by first responders, and important databases related to 
the information needs of the three services, police, fire service and ambulance. One of the GMS screens 
is a data-entry screen where new information can be added into the database. The other screen shows 
geographical information about the position of the first responders (e.g., police cars), and the location of 
the incident. Of course, the centralists use telecommunication devices such as phones, radios and pagers 
to communicate with citizens and with first responders. The phones are integrated into a system that 
gives the centralists instant access to the most important numbers (landlines) such as those for hospitals, 
doctors, police stations and other organizations that are part of the critical infrastructure.
Data entered into GMS by the centralists is visible to those in the three first response services, except 
for data that are filtered, for example, because of confidential information. The data within GMS can also 
be consulted by the RTIC generalists. They know which background information will be critical to the 
first responders, and how to create a COP on the basis of the messages coming in. Their job description 
includes the need for search skills that enable them to access additional information, and the ability to 
filter relevant information from social media. This is in contrast to the work of a centralist, who responds 
to the incoming data in a reactive manner (i.e., after the call has come in, or after an incident has hap-
pened). The generalists, however, can enrich data by adding background information such as information 
on locations, persons, the social environment, and historical detail. This information is entered into GMS 
using separate files. The generalists can send it to the first responders.
The RTIC’s function can be seen as that of an intelligence service – it collects, analyses, and exploits 
information to support the response room and ultimately the actual response operations (Inspectorate 
of Safety and Justice, 2013, pp. 33-34). The generalists also have access to additional systems such as 
MobiPol, a database with police information, vehicle tracking systems, specific databases, and enter-
prise resource systems. They can also access Blueview, which contains over 55 million documents with 
information about criminals and past crimes. And finally, of course, they can consult open information 
sources such as those on the Internet.
The Introduction of the Twitcident Project
The management of the safety region started to implement the Twitcident project on 1st April 2014. Their 
main concern was how the professionals in the response room could use social media data proactively. 
Our interviews with the centralists revealed that they heard about the project only two days before it was 
introduced. The manager responsible for the instruction used a PowerPoint presentation to explain the 
technical functionalities of the project. He also drew attention to the way in which the centralists and 
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generalists should use the tool as an addition to the systems already in use. Since the introduction was 
done with an emphasis on the technical aspects of the tool, the centralists and the generalists – considered 
to be the end-users – did not directly understand the main goal of the project and how Twitcident could 
be integrated into their daily routines and information management practices.
According to the managers that we interviewed some weeks after the introduction, however, the goal 
of Twitcident was clear: using social media websites as an ‘antenna’, the centralists were supposed to 
capture important information from citizens. Social media data could provide an answer, at least in part, 
to the question ‘what is going on in society’. At the same time, for them Twitcident was an important 
project to see whether and how they could align ideas and practices about the use of social media at times 
of crisis at a local and national level. Twitcident was for them also a tool for organizational change. Both 
the centralists and the generalists were provided with a personal account (including login and password) 
to access Twitcident. This way, the managers coordinating the pilot could check who was using the tool, 
and what kind of (search) actions were taking place.
The centralists, however, interpreted the tool first and foremost as an enabling instrument that would 
help enlarge the common operational picture when incidents were taking place. In other words, for 
them it became an extra sensor that could be used to provide first responders in the field with relevant 
information about a particular incident. Also, they saw the introduction of the pilot as an attempt by the 
management to take initiative: with the introduction of Twitcident they could show sensitivity to the 
hype surrounding social media.
The rather inadequate ‘management of expectations’ resulted in different and at times conflicting 
ideas about how Twitcident could be used. The managers could fall back on a mutual feeling that so-
cial media data was potentially useful for the centralists’ work, but there was no consensus about how 
that potential could be fully exploited. The centralists doubted from the start whether the Twitcident 
information would really be helpful to them in their daily operations and at times of crisis. To them it 
was unclear how they could link the information to other sources of information that they could already 
access. Also, the centralists had many questions about the way they could make sense of the additional 
information. While this objection could easily be interpreted as resulting from unfamiliarity with the 
system, there was another aspect of Twitcident that bothered them a lot. Their concern was that imple-
menting and using Twitcident would be very time-consuming in a situation in which they were already 
experiencing a heavy workload.
Twitcident in Use
The Twitcident interface contains a set of filters (i.e., search options) that capture and categorize incoming 
information. The most important filters are tweets and retweets. Retweets are the messages on Twitter 
that show content that was initially posted (‘tweeted’) by another user. The format is RT @username 
where username is the Twitter name of the person one is retweeting. Within Twitcident, the tweets are 
categorized on the basis of predefined search terms and city names. The search terms represent the types 
of incident. Table 1 shows the Twitcident interface: the first column contains the city names, and the top 
row represents the types of incident.
The table shows the number of tweets per city and per incident. The city names and types of incident 
are not only categories but also hyperlinks. The generalist can use the links to add details of a particu-
lar incident, historical data, and the like. Since the software automatically generates data on the basis 
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of the retweets, the generalist’s most important task is to enrich the data with background information 
and details about the location and environment. The generalist can consult the content of the tweets and 
retweets by clicking on the numbers that pop up in the table. He or she then can decide on the relative 
urgency of a tweet or retweet and, if needed, delete those hits that simply cause noise in the information 
stream (e.g., because they contain false or irrelevant information). The generalist also can mark an ac-
count as spam, so that Twitcident no longer accepts incoming information from that particular account.
Twitcident also has an archival storage or preservation function because digital information – the 
tweets and retweets – is easily lost or corrupted. This storage function can help the generalists when they 
are writing after-action reports or looking at patterns of information.
Analysis and Discussion
The added value of Twitcident for the daily response room practices was disappointing. In the first eight 
weeks after the introduction of the tool (the same period in which we did our observations), there was 
no proactive use of the social media data. In other words, the expectations of the management that the 
tool could be used as an antenna, or ‘early warning monitoring’ system, were not met. Furthermore, 
although the generalists and centralists started to work together in the weeks after Twitcident was intro-
duced, the centralists told us that the work of the generalists had little effect on their work routines. From 
our observations and interviews with centralists and generalists we could discern three main practical 
problems in the actual implementation and use of Twitcident.
First, the generalists complained about the constraining effect of the pre-defined search terms. The 
search terms are based on the categories set up by the generalists. For example, they have to categorize 
incoming calls under terms such as Public Order, Robbery, Fire, etc. Social media data, however, is messy 
and full of contradictions. Citizens who post a tweet about a burglary use terms such as ‘we’ve had a 
break-in’, ‘theft’, ‘break-in’, ‘someone’s broken in’ and the like. In other words, citizens use a variety of 
terms, including more colloquial language. For the generalists it was challenging, if not impossible, to 
Table 1. The Twitcident interface with the categories City Names and Types of Incident
City Name Burglary Robbery Hacked ATM 
Machine
Physical 
Violence
Public 
Order
Guns Fire
aaa 11 13 2 12
bbb 12 132 1 171 1 4 18
ccc 4 30 7 1 5
ddd 9 23 5 7 1 86
eee 9 6 24 67 154
fff 21 34 2 25 2 5 276
ggg 6 1 5
hhh 25 55 22 4 16 13
iii 14 19 32 6 9 13
jjj 2 2 9
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use the search terms systematically in order ‘filter’ the social media data. The predefined search terms 
stopped them from making flexible choices and interpretations of the raw data. The Twitcident software 
allowed them to add new search terms, but it was very difficult for the generalists to come to a consensus 
about more adequate categories.
Second, the generalists were confronted with different uses and interpretations of the terms by the 
different first response disciplines. In particular the police have their own terminology, and since most 
of the Twitter data has to do with public order and safety, they started to dominate the discussion about 
terms and categories (as is also reflected in the table). The generalists started to adjust the terms, which 
led to an instant increase in the number of Twitcident hits. The main problem still remained: the search 
terms turned out to be too specific for the generic use and analysis of social media data.
Third, for the generalists geo-information is crucial for validating tweets and for linking the informa-
tion to other sources and informing first responders on the ground. Therefore a tweet or retweet is only 
recognized in Twitcident if it contains geo-information on the sender. Tweets without a geo-location and/
or a city name are filtered out. However, since most people who use Twitter do not add geo-information, 
most of the data from Twitter turned out to add no value to the information that was already available. 
Potentially, a lot of valuable data was missed or filtered out.
Alongside these practical issues, we see two more fundamental problems with Twitcident and the 
way that the social media is, or could be, used in the daily practices and routines of the emergency 
response room.
First, the generalists and centralists became demotivated in the weeks following the introduction of 
Twitcident. Social media, and in the case of Twitcident Twitter, was supposed to enrich their job, but in 
reality the data that came out of Twitcident appeared to be rather poor. On top of that, not a single incident 
or emergency was filtered out from the social media data that was not already known by the centralists 
as a result of the 1-1-2 calls. It meant that Twitcident could not meet the management’s expectations of 
being an ‘early warning monitoring system’ or an antenna for social unrest. During our observations we 
noticed that some days after it was introduced, the generalists stopped using Twitcident as part of their 
standard procedure, but instead used it only occasionally and on a relatively ad-hoc basis. They did not 
invest time in establishing stable routines for using Twitcident. For the centralists it meant that they 
were not really able to rely on this additional source of information. What made the integration of the 
Twitcident data even more problematic is that no interconnection (or, in technical terms, interoperability) 
was possible with GMS or with other systems in use. Instead of being a help to them, Twitcident turned 
out to be yet another thing they had to deal with. This made it all too easy for them to ignore Twitcident 
completely. As they told us during the interviews, centralists still believe that Twitcident could be useful, 
but, given their experiences, they see its added value as being for writing after-action reports, for example.
Second, it was really hard for the centralists to fully appreciate the tool since they were not involved 
in its design, nor in the implementation process. They saw Twitcident as a management initiative. In the 
absence of an adequate monitoring process, the result was a significant mismatch between expectations and 
actual experiences, a problem that is commonly reported in the information technology implementation 
literature (Fleck et al., 1990). Twitcident was introduced in a top-down fashion and the management had 
high expectations, but the professionals who actually had to work with the tool felt a lack of ownership. 
The work of a centralist can be stressful, particularly during incidents and emergencies. Information 
overload and time pressures are serious concerns for them, and paradoxically this is especially the case 
at times when the potential of social media data is at its greatest.
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SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We have shown in this chapter that the management of the emergency response room and coordinators 
of the tool had high expectations of the pilot project. In particular they expected Twitcident to be a rich 
source of instant data not just at times of crisis, but also for day-to-day operations. However, the first 
results turned out to be disappointing. Not only was the social media data hard to validate (i.e., it was 
difficult to verify the trustworthiness of the content), but it was also almost impossible to keep up with 
the amount of data provided by Twitcident. When the centralists tried to use Twitcident to improve their 
operational picture, they had a difficult time interpreting and validating social media data and linking 
it to other sources of information. In addition, looking through social media content for ‘monitoring’ 
purposes turned out to be useless. This does not mean, however, that the use of social media data has to 
be abandoned completely by the safety region response rooms.
What needs to happen is first of all that, the generalists and centralists must create a shared under-
standing of the intended and unintended consequences of social media data for their work. Having a 
more realistic view of how Twitter, and other social media, could be used in their work will help them 
to develop new work routines (Feldman & Pentland, 2003) in which the use of this additional informa-
tion source can be embedded. Twitcident can only be a valuable extra source of information for the 
centralists if they are clear about why and how they should use it. The dual nature of Twitcident – an 
early warning monitoring system on the one hand, and a system to enlarge COPs on the other – made 
that it fell between two stools. Early warning systems need a different type of organizational routine 
(i.e., scanning big data with broad search terms) than COP development (i.e., a precise and channeled 
search for adequate additional information about a particular incident). Thinking through the routines 
in use (Orlikowski, 1992) needed for Twitcident is crucial for organizations to use the tool effectively.
Second, Twitcident was seen as yet another information source that could be easily accessed and 
consulted by centralists. In other words, it was seen as an ‘information warehouse’ where users could 
select information that was relevant to them in performing their tasks. Unconsciously, they assumed 
that they could simply select information from the warehouse database to help them in executing their 
task because (as with any other information database) the information was supposed to be stored in an 
easy and accessible form (Davenport, 1998). However, to regard Twitcident as a warehouse dataset will 
lead to a failure of the tool. Instead, the use of Twitcident data must be based on a collective sense-
making perspective. Centralists and generalists have to realize that they (knowingly or unknowingly) 
give meaning to information and that their sensemaking can differ from that of other people because 
there are differences in routines, beliefs and assumptions that can potentially lead to misinterpretation 
of information (Wolbers & Boersma, 2013). Upfront there is no guarantee that social media data can 
contribute to creating COPs or help organizations to monitor behavior. If Twitcident is to contribute to 
the control room information management, the stakeholders involved (the response room’s management, 
generalists, centralists, and first responders) all have to reflect upon their sensemaking process. In other 
words, simply sending data from Twitcident from the RTIC room to the emergency response room and 
on to the first responders is useless. It has to have meaning attached, and the only way to do that is to 
talk about the information (Weick, 1988) so that people can then understand the constraints, and start 
to appreciate the relative value of the data source.
Finally, the Twitcident project lacked a proper project plan – there was no thoughtful introduction or 
implementation strategy, let alone a monitoring process. For Twitcident to be successful, the management 
needs to invest far more in ‘managing expectations’. Earlier studies of new technology implementation 
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have shown that top-down introduction of new technologies in organizations can have a disruptive effect. 
Those who implemented such technologies successfully underwent a qualitatively different learning 
process than those who were unsuccessful. Important steps in this process are: enrollment, preparation, 
trials, and reflection (Edmonson et al., 2001). In the Twitcident case it means that the users – generalists 
and centralists – have to be involved in the further use of the tool, and develop the motivation needed to 
use it. Being more reflective about their work would encourage a learning process to begin, and would 
allow them to develop new routines for using social media data. From our interviews it is clear that it is 
not too late for this, since the centralists still believe that there is value to be gained from using social 
media data, but only if they can embed this in their information management routines.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Twitcident was introduced, implemented and used in an emergency response room setting as part of a 
pilot project. For further research it would be interesting to study the subsequent development of Twit-
cident, and to analyze the pros and cons of using social media data for emergency response in a more 
systematic manner. For example, one could look at the use of social media data by first responders in 
major crisis situations or disasters. It might be that disruptions of this kind would also make the general-
ists’ searching of social media sites more targeted.
It is also known that the hectic environment in the emergency response room – with time pressure 
on the centralists – influences the way that information streams are managed. Therefore, it might be 
useful to look at how projects using similar applications are used in other settings where the time pres-
sures are not so great – for example, in marketing or consumer insight activity. (Evans, 2012; Tuton & 
Solomon, 2014).
Clearly, projects such as Twitcident can only succeed if they are carefully embedded in an organiza-
tion’s information management. A future research direction might therefore be to study social media 
as part of the wider and more complex information architecture of an organization (Koltay, 2011) to 
understand the conditions in which the social media data can become part of the structural design of 
shared information environments.
Finally, we need to research and understand how people make sense of social media data in complex 
organizational settings. This chapter has shown that in order to use social media data successfully, we 
have to take seriously the sensemaking processes of who are trying to interpret that data. This would 
require us to look at the social aspects of social media implementation and use. In times of uncertainty, 
people try to make sense of the situation and the incoming information. It is important that we start to 
understand how people in organizational (in our case centralists and generalists) take cues from social 
media data that help them decide which information is relevant for their work. In other words, we need 
to explore creatively the way in which meaning is attached to social media (see, for example, Bechmann 
& Lomborg, 2013).
CONCLUSION
The emergency control room’s management had high expectations of the pilot project Twitcident, as they 
expected it to be a rich source of instant data not just at times of crisis, but also for monitoring processes 
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in daily situations. This dual nature, however, was never adequately explained to the professionals who 
had to work with it - the centralists and generalist. In fact, the implementation process has been done 
in a top-down fashion. Therefore, the generalists and centralists never developed a full understanding 
of the meaning and potential usefulness of Twitcident for their work, which had eventually a negative 
effect on the success of the tool.
Perhaps the most important outcome of our study into the Twitcident project is that professional 
response organizations have to think in advance what to do with social media data and how they want 
to use it. Social media data is not clean; it is messy, full of contradictions, and therefore difficult to inte-
grate into the daily operations of the centralists. The professionals have to develop the skills to actually 
make sense of social media data. They have to ask themselves the question: what does this data actually 
mean? What does it mean for my operations, for my information management, and how does it interfere, 
complement or align with other information sources that we are already using?
Our study makes clear that social media data and information are not very useful if the organization 
does not know how to link this additional source of information to its other information streams. In other 
words, social media has to be strategically integrated into the overall information management of the 
crisis response organization in order to be of use. Our case has clearly shown that the introduction of 
social media (i.e., here the Twitcident project) to the emergency response room must be treated as part 
of a careful learning process that includes enrolment, preparation, trial and testing out. This is the only 
way for such projects to be successful.
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Common Operational Picture (COP): The display of relevant information shared by more than 
one command or unit, facilitation situation awareness.
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Crisis Management: The organization function that deals with expected and unexpected, disruptive 
situations, such as incidents, emergencies and (natural) disasters.
Emergency Response Rooms: Dispatch centers occupied by the first response organizations (i.e. the 
police, fire and ambulance service) for the intake of emergency calls, the ‘cleaning’ of the information 
and for the dissemination of the information to first responders.
GMS: Integrated Emergency Room System.
Information Technology Implementation: The process through which new information technolo-
gies are introduced and enrolled in organizational settings.
RTIC: Real-time intelligence center.
Sense-Making: The process by which people give meaning to information and experiences. The 
sense-making becomes evident through written and spoken narratives.
Social Media: Computer-mediated platforms that enable people to create, share or exchange infor-
mation, ideas, and pictures/videos in virtual communities.
Trading Zone: The notion that data from (social media) information sources is something to talk about, 
that is, actors must give meaning to the data in order to be able to link it to other information sources.
Twitcident: A web-based system for filtering, searching and analyzing data on real-world incidents 
or crises.
ENDNOTES
1  We define social media data as the raw data from social media platforms to which no meaning is 
(as yet) attached. Only after professionals have attached meaning to data can we speak of informa-
tion.
